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ABSTRACT
We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and analyze
its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common
central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at
the country level, through the choice of government spending level. The model incorporates country-
specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal monetary policy requires
that  inflation  be  stabilized  at  the  union  level.  On  the  other  hand,  the  relinquishment  of  an
independent monetary policy, coupled with nominal price rigidities, generates a stabilization role for
fiscal policy, one beyond the efficient provision of public goods. Interestingly, the stabilizing role
for fiscal policy is shown to be desirable not only from the viewpoint of each individual country, but
also from that of the union as a whole. In addition, our paper offers some insights on two aspects of
policy design in currency unions: (i) the conditions for equilibrium determinacy and (ii) the effects
of exogenous government spending variations.
Jordi Gali









The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has led to an array of new
challenges for policymakers. Those challenges have been re￿ ected most visibly in the
controversies surrounding the implementation and proposed reforms of the Stability
and Growth Pact, as well as in the frequent criticisms of the interest rate policy of the
European Central Bank. From the perspective of macroeconomic theory, the issues
raised by EMU have created an urgent need for an analytical framework that would
allow us to evaluate alternative monetary and ￿scal policy arrangements for EMU,
or other monetary unions that may emerge in the future. In the present paper we
propose a tractable framework suitable for the analysis of ￿scal and monetary policy
in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies
from the viewpoint of the union as a whole.
In our opinion that analytical framework has to meet several desiderata. First,
it has to incorporate some of the main features characterizing the optimizing models
with nominal rigidities that have been developed and used for monetary policy analy-
sis in recent years. Secondly, it should contain a ￿scal policy sector, with a purposeful
￿scal authority. Thirdly, the framework should comprise many open economies, linked
by trade and ￿nancial ￿ ows.
It is worth noticing that while several examples of optimizing sticky price models
of the world economy can be found in the literature, tractability often requires that
they be restricted to two-country world economies.1 Yet, while such a framework
may be useful to discuss issues pertaining to the links between two large economies
(say, the U.S. and the euro area), it can hardly be viewed as a realistic description
of the incentives and constraints facing policymakers in a monetary union like EMU,
currently made up of twelve countries (each with an independent ￿scal authority),
but expected to accommodate as many as thirteen additional members over the next
few years. Clearly, and in contrast with models featuring two large economies, the
majority of the countries in EMU are small relative to the union as a whole. As a
result, their policy decisions, taken in isolation, are likely to have very little impact
1See, among others, Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Benigno and Be-
nigno (2003), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), Devereux and Engle (2003), Pappa (2003), Koll-
mann (2001), Chari , Kehoe and McGrattan (2003). Only a subset of these contributions feature a
role for a ￿scal sector. For a recent analysis of monetary-￿scal policy interaction in a two-country
setting and ￿ exible exchange rates see Lombardo and Sutherland (2004). For a two-country analysis
more speci￿cally tailored to a monetary union, see Ferrero (2005).
1on other countries. While it should certainly be possible, as a matter of principle, to
modify some of the existing two-country models to incorporate an arbitrarily large
number of countries (i.e. an N-country model, for large N), it is clear that such
undertaking would render the resulting model virtually intractable.
In the present paper we propose a tractable framework for policy analysis in a
monetary union that meets the three desiderata listed above. First, we introduce
nominal rigidities by assuming a staggered price setting structure, analogous to the
one embedded in the workhorse model used for monetary policy analysis in closed
economies, which we treat as a useful benchmark. Secondly, we model the currency
union as being made up by a continuum of small open economies, subject to im-
perfectly correlated productivity shocks. This approach allows one to overcome the
tractability problems associated with ￿large N,￿by making each economy of negli-
gible size relative to the rest of the world . Finally, we incorporate a ￿scal policy
sector, by allowing for country-speci￿c levels of public consumption, and by having
the latter yield utility to domestic households.
Our analysis focuses on the optimal ￿scal and monetary policies from the view-
point of the currency union as a whole. In particular we determine the monetary
and ￿scal policy rules that maximize a second-order approximation to the integral
of utilities of the representative households inhabiting the di⁄erent countries in the
union.
Two main results emerge from that analysis. First, we show that it is optimal
for the (common) monetary authority to stabilize in￿ ation in the union as a whole.
Attaining that goal generally requires o⁄setting the threats to price stability that
may arise from the joint impact of the ￿scal policies implemented at the country
level. Our ￿nding would thus seem to provides a rationale for a monetary policy
strategy like the one adopted by the European Central Bank, i.e. one that focuses on
attaining price stability for the union as a whole.2 It is important to stress, however,
that the optimality of that policy is conditional on the national ￿scal authorities
simultaneously implementing their part of the optimal policy package. The latter
implies a neutral ￿scal stance in the aggregate￿ in a sense to be made precise below￿
, which poses no in￿ ationary pressures on the union. As discussed below, in the
2Benigno (2004) obtains a similar result in the context of a currency union model without a ￿scal
sector. His analysis focuses on the implications of asymmetries across countries on the de￿nition of
the relevant price index to be stabilized. Our focus is instead on the interaction between monetary
and ￿scal policies.
2absence of such coordinated response by the national ￿scal authorities, the union￿ s
central bank may ￿nd it optimal to deviate from a strict in￿ ation targeting policy.
Second, under the optimal policy arrangement, each country￿ s ￿scal authority
plays a dual role, trading-o⁄between the provision of an e¢ cient level of public goods
and the stabilization of domestic in￿ ation and output gap. Interestingly, we ￿nd that
the existence of such a stabilizing role for ￿scal policy is desirable not only from the
viewpoint of each individual country, but also from that of the union as a whole.
Our simulations under the optimal policy mix of a representative economy￿ s response
to an idiosyncratic productivity shock show that the strength of the countercyclical
￿scal response increases with the importance of nominal rigidities. Our ￿ndings on
this front call into question the desirability of imposing external constraints on a
currency union￿ s members ability to conduct countercyclical ￿scal policies that seek
to limit the size of the domestic output gap and in￿ ation di⁄erentials resulting from
idiosyncratic shocks.
In addition to the main results just described, our paper sheds new light on two
additional aspects of policy design in currency unions, in the presence of nominal
rigidities. The ￿rst issue pertains to the conditions for equilibrium determinacy. As is
well known from the closed economy literature, in order to guarantee the uniqueness of
equilibrium the central bank must eventually adjust the nominal interest rates more
than one-for-one with changes in in￿ ation, a property generally referred to as the
￿Taylor principle.￿ 3 When joining a currency union, a small economy relinquishes its
ability to meet the Taylor principle, since variations in its rate of in￿ ation that are the
result of purely idiosyncratic shocks will have a small (in￿nitesimal, in our model)
e⁄ect on union-wide in￿ ation, and will thus induce little or no response from the
union￿ s central bank. This may raise doubts regarding the possibility of guaranteeing
a unique equilibrium and avoiding unnecessary sunspot ￿ uctuations in that context.
Our analysis demonstrates that the equilibrium path for country-level variables will
be uniquely determined so long as the equilibrium is determinate for the union as a
whole. This can in turn be guaranteed by having the union￿ s central bank follow an
interest rate rule that satis￿es the usual Taylor principle.
Secondly, we provide an analysis of the e⁄ects of an exogenous change in govern-
ment spending in a small open economy belonging to a monetary union (or, equiv-
alently, under a hard peg). While in the closed economy counterpart the e⁄ects of
3See, e.g., Woodford (2001).
3a change in government spending are ambiguous, ￿ since they always depend on the
endogenous response of monetary policy to the ￿scal intervention4￿this is not case
for a country in a currency union: in the latter case an increase in government spend-
ing always raises output and the price level in the short run, after which a period of
sustained de￿ ation is needed to restore the initial terms of trade.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the basic model. In
Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium dynamics in a currency union, from the
perspective of both a single member economy and of the union as a whole. In Section
4 we study optimal monetary and ￿scal policy in a currency union. We take for
granted an institutional arrangement in which monetary policy is conducted by a
common central bank, whereas ￿scal policy is conducted at the level of each member
country. We contrast the case of full price ￿ exibility to the more realistic one involving
nominal rigidities. Section 5 concludes and suggests extensions for future work.
2 A Currency Union Model
We model the currency union as a closed system, made up of a continuum of small
open economies represented by the unit interval. Each economy, indexed by i 2
[0;1] is of measure zero; as a result, its domestic policy decisions do not have any
impact on the rest of the union. While di⁄erent economies are subject to imperfectly
correlated shocks, we assume that they share identical preferences, technology, and
market structure.5
Next we describe in detail the problem facing households and ￿rms in our model
economy.
2.1 Households
Consider a typical country belonging to the monetary union (say, country i). We













4See, for instance, Linnemann and Schabert (2003).
5In Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005) we use a similar modelling formalism, though the focus of the
paper￿ the design of monetary policy by a single, small open economy with its own central bank￿ is
very di⁄erent from the one in the present paper.
4where Ci
t, Ni
t denote, respectively, private consumption and hours of work, while Gi
t
is an index of public consumption, described in a separate section below.
More precisely, Ci







(1 ￿ ￿)(1￿￿)￿￿ (2)
where Ci
i;t is an index of country i￿ s consumption of domestic goods (i.e., goods














where j 2 [0;1] denotes the type of good (within the set produced in country i).6
Variable Ci











f;t is, in turn, the log of an index of the quantity of goods consumed
by country i￿ s households that are produced in (and, hence, imported from) country














Notice that in the speci￿cation of preferences described above ￿ 2 [0;1] is the
weight on imported goods in the utility of private consumption. Given that the weight
of the home economy in the union is in￿nitesimal, a value for ￿ strictly less than one
re￿ ects the presence of home bias in private consumption, implying that households
in di⁄erent countries will have di⁄erent consumption baskets.7 Equivalently, we can
think of ￿ as an index of openness.
Finally, notice that parameter ￿ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between
varieties produced within any given country, independently of the producing country.




























6As discussed below, each country produces a continuum of di⁄erentiated goods, represented by
the unit interval. Each good is produced by a separate ￿rm. No good is produced in more than one
country.
7As a result, CPI in￿ ation di⁄erentials across countries may emerge, even if the law of one price
holds for each individual good.
5for t = 0;1;2;:::, where P
f
t (j) is the price of good j produced in country f (expressed
in units of the single currency). Di
t+1 is the nominal payo⁄ in period t + 1 of the
portfolio held at the end of period t (and which includes shares in ￿rms, local and
foreign), W i
t is the nominal wage, and T i
t denotes lump-sum taxes.
We assume that households have access to a complete set of contingent claims,
traded across the union. Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead
nominal payo⁄s, common across countries. Also, implicit in the notation in (5)￿ which
features a single country index for each price￿ is the assumption that the law of one
price holds across the union.
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure on the goods produced in a given

































represents country i￿ s domestic price
index (i.e., an index of prices of domestically produced goods), for all i 2 [0;1].









is the price index for the bundle of goods imported from country f, as well as the































t df is the union-wide price index. From the
viewpoint of any individual country, P ￿
t is also a price index for imported goods.





f;t df = P ￿
t Ci
F;t
Finally, and letting P i
c;t ￿ (P i
t)1￿￿(P ￿
t )￿ denote the consumer price index (CPI)
in country i, the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported


















Combining all previous results, we can write total consumption expenditures by




F;t = P i
c;tCi
t. Thus, and conditional on an optimal
















In what follows we assume that the period utility takes the simple form




where parameter ￿ 2 [0;1) measures the weight attached to public consumption
(relative to private consumption).

























which are assumed to hold for all period and states of nature (at t and t + 1, in the
case of (12)). Taking conditional expectations on both sides of (12) and rearranging


















EtfQt;t+1g is the gross nominal return on a riskless one-period discount
bond paying o⁄ one unit of the common currency in t + 1 or, for short, the (gross)
nominal interest rate. Below we assume that the union￿ s central bank uses that
interest rate as its main instrument of monetary policy.
For future reference it is useful to note that (11) and (13) can be respectively
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c;t+1g ￿ ￿) (14)
where, as before, lower case letters denote the logs of the respective variables, ￿ ￿
￿log￿ is the time discount rate, and ￿i
c;t ￿ pi
c;t ￿ pi
c;t￿1 is CPI in￿ ation. The above
optimality conditions hold for all i 2 [0;1]
72.1.1 Some De￿nitions and Identities
Before proceeding with our analysis, we introduce several assumptions and de￿nitions,
and derive a number of identities that are extensively used below.







t , i.e., the price of country f￿ s domestically produced goods in terms of











































t + ￿ s
i
t (15)
Hence, it follows that domestic in￿ation ￿de￿ned as the rate of change in the
price index for domestically produced goods, i.e., ￿i
t ￿ pi
t ￿ pi
t￿1 ￿and CPI in￿ation





t + ￿ ￿s
i
t (16)
which makes the gap between our two measures of in￿ ation proportional to the percent
change in the terms of trade, with the coe¢ cient of proportionality given by the index
of openness ￿.
Notice that the distinction between CPI in￿ ation and domestic in￿ ation, while
meaningful at the level of each country, vanishes for the currency union as a whole.
Formally, integrating (15) over i 2 [0;1] and using the fact that
R 1
0 si










82.1.2 International Risk Sharing
Under the assumption of complete markets for state-contingent securities across the
union, a ￿rst order condition analogous to (12) will hold for the representative house-


















Combining (12) and (17), we obtain:
C
i






for all i;f 2 [0;1] and all t, and where #i is a constant which will generally depend
on initial conditions regarding relative net asset positions. Henceforth, and without
loss of generality, we assume symmetric initial conditions (i.e., zero net foreign asset
holdings for all countries, combined with an ex-ante identical environment), in which
case we have #i = # = 1 for all i 2 [0;1].













t df is the (log) aggregate consumption index for the union as a whole.
2.2 Optimal Allocation of Government Purchases














t(j) is the quantity of domestic good j purchased by the government. For
simplicity, we assume that government purchases are fully allocated to domestically
produced goods.8
For any given level of public consumption Gi
t (whose determination is a central
focus of the analysis below), the government allocates expenditures across goods in
8For OECD countries, there is evidence of strong home bias in government procurement, over
and above that observed in private consumption . See for instance Trionfetti (2000) and Brulhart
and Trionfetti (2004).
9order to minimize total cost. This yields the following set of government demand













In order to focus our attention on the determination of its aggregate level and
its e⁄ects (rather than the distortions induced by its ￿nancing), we assume that




Each country has a continuum of ￿rms represented by the interval [0;1]. Each ￿rm
produces a di⁄erentiated good with a linear technology:
Y
i





for all i;j 2 [0;1], where Ai
t is a country-speci￿c productivity shifter. The latter is
assumed to follow an AR(1) process (in logs):
a
i







t , ￿a 2 [0;1], and f"i
tg is white noise.
The assumption of a linear technology implies that the real marginal cost (ex-
pressed in terms of domestic goods) is common across ￿rms in any given country, and
given (in logs) by
mc
i


















denote the aggregate output index for country i.






















t dj. In the Appendix we show that equilibrium variations in
zi
t ￿ logZi
t around the perfect foresight steady state are of second order. Thus,
and up to a ￿rst order approximation, the following relationship between aggregate









Firms are assumed to set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo (1983). Hence,
a measure 1 ￿ ￿ of (randomly selected) ￿rms sets new prices each period, with an
individual ￿rm￿ s probability of re-optimizing in any given period being independent
of the time elapsed since it last reset its price. As is well known, the optimal price-
setting strategy for the typical ￿rm resetting its price in period t can be approximated
by the (log-linear) rule:9
p
i










t denotes the (log) of newly set prices in country i (same for all ￿rms reop-
timizing), and ￿ ￿ log ￿
￿￿1 is the (log) of the optimal markup in the corresponding
￿ exible price economy (or, equivalently, the markup prevailing in a zero in￿ ation
steady state).
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 Aggregate Demand and Output Determination
The clearing of market for good j produced in country i requires
Y
i






















































































and where the last equality makes use of (18). An analogous condition must hold for
all i;j 2 [0;1] and all t.









we obtain the following aggregate goods market clearing
9The approximation is carried out around a zero in￿ ation steady state. See the appendix in Gal￿
and Monacelli (2005) for a derivation in the context of a model with an identical price-setting block.











A log-linear ￿rst order approximation of that market clearing condition around a
(symmetric) steady state is given by:10
b y
i
t = (1 ￿ ￿) (b c
i
t + ￿ s
i
t) + ￿ b g
i
t (26)
where a "b" symbol is used to denote log deviations of a variable from its steady
state value, e.g. b xt ￿ xt ￿ x, and where ￿ ￿ G
Y denotes the steady state government
spending share.
Using (19) and the terms of trade de￿nition, we can rewrite (26) as follows:
b y
i
t = ￿ b g
i
t + (1 ￿ ￿) b c
￿





The previous equation establishes that domestic output is positively related to
government spending, union-wide consumption (which is an index for the strength of
foreign demand), and inversely related to domestic prices (relative to average prices
in the union).
Notice that we can integrate (27) over i 2 [0;1] in order to obtain the union-wide
goods market clearing condition:
b y
￿
t = ￿ b g
￿












Similarly, integrating (14) over i ￿ [0;1] and combining the resulting di⁄erence
equation with (28), yields the following union-wide dynamic IS equation:
b y
￿
t = Etfb y
￿










0 ￿i;t di. We can solve the previous equation forward and, under the
assumption that limT!1 Etfb g￿
t+Tg = limT!1 Etfb y￿
t+Tg = 0 , write it in level form as:
b y
￿
t = ￿ b g
￿








10The derivation makes use of a ￿rst order Taylor expansion of log(Y i
t ￿ Gi
t), as shown in the
Appendix. We also use the fact that in a symmetric steady state Si = 1 (and hence si = 0) for all
i 2 [0;1].
12Hence, we see that ￿ uctuations in union-wide output will result from variations
in union-wide government spending and expected long-term rates, with the weight
attached to both factors being positively and negatively related, respectively, to the
steady state share of government spending in output.
3.2 The Supply Side: Marginal Cost and In￿ ation Dynamics
Given our assumption of price setting ￿ la Calvo, the dynamics of domestic in￿ ation in
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t+￿ denotes the (log) deviation of real marginal cost from its steady
state, and ￿ ￿
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿)
￿ .11


























t + ’ n
i




t ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿
i) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿) (31)
We can now combine (31) with (22) and (26) to obtain an expression for marginal
cost as a function of output and government spending, all expressed in deviations
















t ￿ (1 + ’) a
i
t (32)
The intuition for the negative relationship between marginal cost and government
spending is easy to grasp: given output, an increase in government spending crowds
out domestic consumption and/or generates a real appreciation, both of which tend
to reduce real marginal cost through their negative e⁄ect on the product wage.12
In addition, we see that the elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to output
is increasing in the government share ￿. The reason is simple: in response to a
11Notice that under our assumptions the fact that each individual economy is open does not a⁄ect
the form of the equation relating domestic in￿ ation to real marginal cost. See Gal￿ and Monacelli
(2005) for further discussion and a formal derivation.
12Notice that the corresponding elasticity is increasing in ￿, since the greater the weight of gov-
ernment spending in aggregate demand the larger will be the percent decline in consumption needed
to keep output constant.
13given percent increase in output, and given an unchanged current level of current
government spending b gi
t and technology ai
t, a larger ￿ is associated with a larger
percent increase in consumption and/or the terms of trade. As a result, a larger
increase in the product wage and, hence, marginal cost will obtain.
Combining (30) and (32) we can derive a version of the new Keynesian Phillips
curve (NKPC), applying to each economy in the union:
￿
i















t ￿ ￿(1 + ’) a
i
t (33)
Notice also that by integrating the previous equation over i ￿ [0;1] we can obtain
the corresponding new Keynesian Phillips curve for the union as a whole:
￿
￿























We have now derived the set of log-linear equilibrium conditions for in￿ ation and
output in each individual country (summarized by (27), and (33)), as well as for the
union as a whole (given by (29) and (34)), as a function of government spending
(local and union-wide) and the common interest rate. Given the equilibrium path
of those variable, one can use (14) (or, equivalently, (12)) to back out equilibrium
consumption in each country.
Next we turn to the analysis of some properties of that equilibrium, before we
plunge into the central question of optimal policy design. We start with a brief (but
important) digression on the conditions for equilibrium determinacy in a currency
union.
3.3 Equilibrium Determinacy in the Currency Union: A Di-
gression
We start our digression by noticing that the linearized equilibrium dynamics for the
currency union as a whole are analogous to those in the baseline, closed economy
new Keynesian model. In particular, and given an exogenous stationary process
for fg￿
t;a￿
tg, the equilibrium dynamics for union-wide in￿ ation ￿￿
t and output b y￿
t,
are described by equations (29) and (34). In order "to close the model" those two
equations should be supplemented with an additional equation describing how the
central bank sets the interest rate r￿
t.
14As is well known from the closed-economy literature, to the extent that the interest
rate rule adopted by the central bank satis￿es the so-called ￿Taylor principle,￿the
equilibrium path for output and in￿ ation is uniquely pinned down, as a function of
the exogenous shocks (see Bullard and Mitra (2001), Woodford (2001)).
Consider, for the sake of concreteness, the following interest rate rule for the
union￿ s central bank:
r
￿
t = ￿ + ￿￿ ￿
￿
t + ￿a a
￿
t + ￿g b g
￿
t (35)
where ￿￿ is assumed to be non-negative. Under that speci￿cation of monetary policy,
a straightforward application of the ￿ndings of Bullard and Mitra (2001) to our model,
implies that the equilibrium for the union will be uniquely determined if and only if
￿￿ > 1, i.e., if the central bank adjusts the short-term nominal rate more than one-
for-one in response to variations in union-wide in￿ ation ￿￿
t.13 Given the equilibrium
values for b y￿
t, one can easily back out aggregate consumption b c￿
t (using (28)), as well
as other variables of interest.
Suppose that the interest rate rule followed by the union￿ s central bank guarantees
a unique equilibrium for union-wide variables. What can we say about the uniqueness
of equilibrium in each of the member countries?
Notice that for each individual country￿ s economy one can also derive conditions
analogous to the closed economy. The corresponding in￿ ation equation is already
given by (33). The corresponding dynamic IS equation can be easily derived by
combining (26) with (14) and (16), which yields
b y
i
t = Etfb y
i




t+1g ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿Etf￿b g
i
t+1g (36)
While the previous equations take the form of the analogous conditions for the
standard closed economy model, there exists an important di⁄erence: even if the
union￿ s central bank follows an interest rule satisfying the Taylor principle, its setting
of the interest rate r￿
t no longer responds systematically to domestic in￿ ation ￿i
t (or
domestic output b yi
t, for that matter), since the latter has only an in￿nitesimal weight
in aggregate in￿ ation ￿￿
t (or in b y￿
t , in the case of output).14 Hence, a straightforward
application of the Taylor principle logic seems to imply that equilibrium should indeed
13In Section 4 we show that the optimal monetary policy in the currency union can be implemented
by a policy of this form, with a speci￿c choice of coe¢ cients ￿a and ￿g, but an arbitrary ￿￿ > 1.
14Even if fundamental shocks are highly correlated across countries (thus allowing for potentially
high correlation between ￿i
t and ￿￿
t), it is still the case that r￿
t will not respond to an eventual change
in ￿i
t that is driven by revisions in expectations unrelated to economic fundamentals, the source of
potential indeterminacy.
15be indeterminate in each individual economy, since from the latter￿ s point of view r￿
t
can be viewed as exogenous. That logic, nevertheless, is incorrect, for it fails to take
into account an additional condition -given by equation (27)- that must be satis￿ed in
equilibrium for each individual economy, and which we repeat here for convenience:
b y
i
t = ￿ b g
i
t + (1 ￿ ￿)b c
￿





That condition establishes a link between the levels of domestic output and do-
mestic prices (with the remaining variables being exogenous) which is absent in the
closed economy benchmark model. That link is a consequence of the e⁄ects of the
terms of trade on demand, combined with the one-to-one mapping between domes-
tic prices and the terms of trade (given p￿
t) which results from the assumption of a
common currency (and, hence, a constant exchange rate). Roughly speaking, the
adoption of a hard peg against a currency of a country (or a currency union) whose
price level is uniquely pinned down by its own monetary regime, acts as a substitute
for the adoption of an autonomous monetary policy satisfying the Taylor principle.
The previous point can be demonstrated quite easily. First note that we can
combine (27) and (28) to yield:
b y
i
t ￿ b y
￿
t = ￿ (b g
i
t ￿ b g
￿





Second, subtracting (34) from (33) and combining the resulting expression with (37)
allows us to derive, after some straightforward algebra, the following di⁄erence equa-
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where ! ￿ 1
1+￿+￿[1+’(1￿￿)] 2 [0; 1
1+￿) and ui
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The above di⁄erence equation (38) has a unique stationary solution, of the form:
s
i














Given the equilibrium path for the terms of trade fsi
tg, determined by (39), we
can back out the equilibrium levels of domestic prices and output using the de￿nition
of the terms of trade and (37).
163.4 The E⁄ects of Domestic Government Spending Shocks
While not the focus of the present paper it is useful to consider the e⁄ects of an
exogenous change in government spending, in order to understand the mechanisms
that may make it a useful policy tool in the absence of an autonomous monetary
policy.









Without loss of generality, we assume that the union￿ s economy is in a perfect
foresight, zero in￿ ation steady state and we set p￿
t = b g￿
t = a￿
t = ai
t = 0 for all t. Under
the previous assumptions, we have ut = ￿￿’￿ b gi
t . It then follows from (39) that
p
i
t = ￿ p
i
t￿1 +  g b g
i
t (40)
where  g ￿
￿￿’￿
1￿￿￿￿g > 0.
Hence, a positive shock to domestic government spending leads to a persistent
rise in the domestic price level, though the latter eventually returns to its original
level (given stationarity of b gi
t). Equivalently, domestic in￿ ation initially increases, but
eventually turns negative. How long in￿ ation remains positive after the shock will
depend on both ￿ and ￿g.
Given the response of domestic prices fdpi
+kg1
k=0, the e⁄ect of on domestic output
on impact and over time can be derived from equation (27):
db y
i
+k = ￿ ￿
k
g ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) dp
i
+k
Notice that the e⁄ect on impact is given by
db y
i
+0 = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)  g
As prices approach the "full stickiness" limit (￿ ! 0, ￿ ! 1,  g ! 0) we have
db yi
+0 = ￿, in other words, output increases one for one with government spending,
since there is no crowding out e⁄ect resulting from higher domestic prices (we have
a unit "level" multiplier). When prices are not completely sticky (￿ > 0) the price
level rises, thus dampening the direct e⁄ect of government spending on output. Hence,
db yi
+0 < ￿ , with the "level" multiplier being less than one. That crowding out e⁄ect
17will be larger the more persistent is the shock (the higher ￿g), since
@ g
@￿g > 0. 15
Notice that the sign and qualitative pattern of the economy￿ s response to a change
in government spending are unambiguous when the country belongs to a currency
union, as in the analysis above. This is in contrast to a closed economy or an open
economy with autonomous monetary policy, since in those cases the e⁄ects of a ￿scal
shock depend on the endogenous response of monetary policy to the ￿scal interven-
tion.16
Figure 1 displays the e⁄ects on output, the output gap, the domestic price level
and in￿ ation of a one percent rise in government spending for alternative values of
the price stickiness parameter #. The output gap is de￿ned here as the deviation
of output from its level under fully ￿ exible prices (and given by equation (32) for
c mc
i
t = 0). Hence we see that a rise in government spending leads to a terms of
trade appreciation (rise in the price level) and a rise in output. The latter e⁄ect is
stronger when prices are more rigid. When prices are ￿ exible (and the output gap
is by de￿nition zero), the e⁄ect on output is dampened but never to such an extent
that the output multiplier turns negative.
4 Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy Design
Next we derive and characterize the optimal ￿scal-monetary regime in the currency
union. The institutional constraints are as follows. Monetary policy is conducted in a
centralized fashion by a common central bank, which sets the short-term nominal rate
r￿
t. Fiscal policy is conducted by each country￿ s ￿scal authority, which determines
the steady state level of government spending Gi, a constant employment subsidy ￿i
and￿ most importantly, given our focus￿ follows a rule describing short term variations
in government spending fb gi
tg in response to shocks of di⁄erent nature.
We seek to derive the monetary and ￿scal policy rules that maximize the welfare
of the union as a whole, given those assumed institutional constraints. We start
by analyzing the social planner￿ s problem. Then we show under what conditions
the e¢ cient allocation can be supported as an equilibrium, under the assumption of
15That crowding e⁄ect is never strong enough to generate a negative response of output. In fact,
under ￿ exible prices (constant markup), equation (32) reduces to
yi




1+’(1￿￿) > 0 and @￿
@￿ > 0.
16See, for instance, Linnemann and Schabert (2003).
18￿ exible prices. Finally, we derive the optimal (second-best) policies in the presence
of nominal rigidities.
4.1 The Social Planner￿ s Problem
The union￿ s optimal allocation in any given period can be described as the solution




























i;t df + G
i
t (41)
for all i 2 [0;1]. Notice that the previous constraints already embed the optimal
condition whereby the di⁄erent good types in any given country should be produced
and consumed in identical quantities.17
Under our speci￿cation of preferences, the optimality conditions for the social




















for all i 2 [0;1]. In words, the marginal loss of utility for a household in country i
of producing an additional unit of the composite good, given by (Ni
t)’=Ai
t, must be
equal, at the margin, to the utility gain resulting from any of the three possible uses
of that additional output: consumption by domestic households, consumption by all
households in the union, and domestic government spending.
Using the resource constraint (41), and the fact that Y i
t = Ai
tNi
t, we can guess
and verify that the solution to the social planner￿ s problem is given by:
N
i








i;t = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) A
i
t (44)
17That condition in turn implies that Zi
t = 1 in (21), for all i 2 [0;1]
19C
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t = ￿ A
i
t (46)
for all i;f 2 [0;1], and all t.
Combining (44) and (45), together with de￿nition of country i￿ s total consumption



























t df is an index of union-wide productivity.
Aggregating over countries, we obtain the corresponding optimal allocation for













t = ￿ A
￿
t
4.2 Decentralization of the E¢ cient Allocation under Flexi-
ble Prices
Before we turn to the interesting case of optimal policy in the presence of nominal
rigidities, it is useful to examine the case of ￿ exible prices, since it constitutes a useful
benchmark as shown below.
We start by showing how, under certain conditions, the union-wide optimal allo-
cation derived above can be supported as an equilibrium in the presence of ￿exible

















































20In order for the equilibrium allocation under ￿ exible prices to correspond to the
union￿ s socially optimal allocation the following conditions must be satis￿ed for all






Secondly, government spending must be set according to the rule18
G
i
t = ￿ A
i
t (48)
If both conditions are satis￿ed for all i 2 [0;1], the ￿ exible price equilibrium will
yield the level of employment and output in each country that is optimal from the





t = 1, for all i 2 [0;1], and all t.19 It is easy
to check that the remaining optimality conditions will also be satis￿ed as a result of
households￿optimization.
Notice that in the economy with ￿ exible prices, the lack of an autonomous mon-
etary policy is of no consequence for the attainment of the optimal allocation, for
monetary policy is neutral in that environment (it can only in￿ uence the path of
prices). As a result, local ￿scal authorities can focus exclusively on the e¢ cient
provision of public consumption goods, according to rule (48) (shadowing the cen-
tral planner￿ s decisions on that front). In our example economy that rule implies a




t = ￿ = ￿ for all t.
While the level of prices in the union and in each individual country is determined
by the monetary policy regime, each country￿ s terms of trade as well as the in￿ ation
di⁄erentials vis a vis the union are fully determined by real factors in the present
scenario. More speci￿cally, note that the path for the terms of trade that will support














for all i 2 [0;1], and all t. Given the de￿nition of the terms of trade it follows that
the in￿ ation di⁄erential will be inversely proportional to the productivity growth
18Or, equivalently, G
i
t = ￿ Y
i
t
19In contrast with Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005), where the optimal allocation problem is analyzed
from the viewpoint of a small open economy, here the choice of the subsidy is not a⁄ected by any
desire to in￿ uence the terms of trade in a country￿ s favor. The reason is simple: that goal cannot be
attained by all countries simultaneously, and hence it serves no purpose when trying to decentralize
the solution to the union￿ s social planner problem. As a result the only role played by the subsidy











In the following section we assume that (47) is satis￿ed, so that the only remaining
non-o⁄set distortion is the presence of nominal rigidities. Our aim is to determine
the optimal design of policy in such an environment, when there is a single monetary
policy but decentralized ￿scal policies.
4.3 Optimal Policy Design in the Presence of Nominal Rigidi-
ties
In the presence of nominal rigidities it will generally be impossible for a monetary
union to attain the optimal allocation. The reasons are well understood. First,
staggered price setting implies that the level of employment and output within each
country may di⁄er from the e¢ cient one at any point in time, both in the aggregate
and across sectors (i.e., good types). This will be true even if the distortion associ-
ated with market power is o⁄set by means of a subsidy, as discussed above. Secondly,
the sluggish adjustment of prices, combined with the impossibility of nominal ex-
change rate adjustments (inherent to a currency union), implies that the changes in
terms of trade that would be required to support the optimal allocation cannot occur
instantaneously.
As shown in Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005) in the context of a related model, when
each individual country has its own currency and an autonomous monetary policy (as
opposed to the monetary union case considered here), a monetary policy that succeeds
in stabilizing the domestic price level in each country would replicate the ￿ exible price
equilibrium and, hence, the optimal allocation. Under a currency union, however, and
to the extent that di⁄erent countries experience asymmetric shocks leading to dis-
crepancies among their natural interest rates, the lack of a country-speci￿c monetary
policy (i.e., an independent interest rate setting) makes it impossible to attain that
outcome. As a result, the union as a whole will experience some deviations from the
optimal allocation and, accordingly, some welfare losses. What is the monetary/￿scal






t denote the (logs) of output and government spending
in country i associated with the union-wide e¢ cient allocation (or equivalently, with
the ￿ exible price equilibrium under an optimal policy). We use the notation e yi
t and
e gi
t to denote the log deviations of country i￿ s output and government spending from
those benchmark levels, i.e., e yi
t ￿ yi
t ￿ yi
t and e gi
t ￿ gi
t ￿ gi
t, which we henceforth refer
to as country i￿ s output gap and government spending gap, respectively.
It will prove convenient to de￿ne the following measure of the ￿scal stance:
e f
i
t ￿ e g
i








which we henceforth refer as the ￿scal gap.20
Using (32), together with the fact that yi
t ￿ yi = gi
t ￿ gi = ai
t (where variables
without time subscripts denote steady state values), we can derive the following

























where we have imposed an optimal steady state government spending share (￿ = ￿).
We can combine the previous expression with (30) to obtain a version of the new
Keynesian Phillips curve for each union member, expressing domestic in￿ ation in
terms of the corresponding output and ￿scal gaps:
￿
i
t = ￿ Etf￿
i








In addition we can combine (27), (28) and (49), to obtain an equation determining
the change in the output gap di⁄erential as a function of the di⁄erentials in ￿scal gap
changes, in￿ ation and productivity growth:
￿e y
i
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The previous two equations describe the evolution of country i￿ s output gap and
price level as a function of the domestic ￿scal gap, given the productivity di⁄erential
20Strictly speaking, gi
t and, hence, e gi
t are only well de￿ned if ￿ > 0, which we assume for the
remainder of this section.
23and the union wide ￿scal and output gaps. They also make clear the nature of the
tradeo⁄s facing policymakers in the union. To illustrate those tradeo⁄s, assume that
e y￿
t = e f￿
t = p￿
t = 0. Consider equation (50), describing the evolution of the price level
in country i. As in the familiar closed economy benchmark, that equation implies
that prices could be fully stabilized by closing the output and ￿scal gaps at all times,
thus trying to replicate the ￿ exible price equilibrium allocation. Yet, (51) makes clear
that this will not be feasible in the presence of asymmetric productivity shocks since,
in that case, closing the output gap (without creating a ￿scal gap) requires that the
terms of trade and, hence, domestic prices, adjust.
4.5 Union-Wide Tradeo⁄s
The evolution of in￿ ation, the output gap, and the ￿scal gap for the currency union is
described by two aggregate equilibrium relationships familiar from the closed economy
case. Thus, by integrating (50), we can derive an equation describing union-wide
in￿ ation in terms of the corresponding gaps:
￿
￿
t = ￿ Etf￿
￿








The union￿ s output gap is determined by a dynamic IS-type equation, which we
can derive using (29):
e y
￿
t = Etfe y
￿





























t is the union￿ s natural rate of interest, given by
rr
￿






= ￿ + Etf￿y
￿
t+1g
= ￿ + Etf￿a
￿
t+1g
Notice that, to the extent that the union￿ s aggregate ￿scal gap e f￿
t remains stable
at zero, there is no tradeo⁄ between stabilization of the output gap and in￿ ation for
the union as a whole. In that case the outcome e y￿
t = e ￿
￿
t = 0 could be easily attained
by having the central bank follow a rule of the sort
rt = rr
￿
t + ￿￿ ￿
￿
t
24On the other hand, if the aggregated decisions of the local ￿scal authorities lead
to ￿ uctuations in the union-wide ￿scal gap, the job of the single central bank is made
considerably more di¢ cult. To illustrate this formally, notice that we can integrate
(53) and combine it with (52) to yield:
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Notice that a positive union-wide ￿scal gap, current and/or anticipated, will gen-
erate upward pressure on current in￿ ation. That pressure can only be partly o⁄set
by having the central bank run a tighter monetary policy, which would require rais-
ing current and/or future interest rates above their natural level, thus dampening
the expansionary impact of members￿￿scal policies on the union￿ s output gap and
in￿ ation. Below we show that this is indeed the sort of rule that the union￿ s central
bank should adopt, as part of the optimal monetary-￿scal policy mix for the union.
4.6 The Optimal Policy Problem
What is the path for the ￿scal gap, for each country and in the aggregate, that is
consistent with maximization of the union￿ s welfare? What are the resulting optimal
output gap and price level paths for the union consistent with that optimal choice?
In the Appendix we show that a second order approximation to the sum of utilities



























di + tips (54)
where tips denotes terms that are independent of policy.
We de￿ne the optimal policy mix for the currency union as the set of rules for the
￿scal gaps fe fi
tg for all i 2 [0;1] and the common interest rate fr￿
tg, along with with
the associated second best outcomes ￿i
t, e yi
t for all t, that maximize (54), subject to



























tg, for all i 2 [0;1]; that maximize (54) subject to (50), (51)
and (55). Secondly, given the solution to that ￿rst-stage problem, we determine the
interest rate rule that will support the implied paths for the union-wide in￿ ation,
output gap and ￿scal gap, using (53).
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Both can be combined to yield
￿ ￿
￿
t + ￿e y
￿
t = 0 (62)
for t = 0;1;2;:::
Integrating (58) over i 2 [0;1], combining the resulting equation with (61) and
the result above, we obtain:
e f
￿
t = ￿e y
￿
t (63)
26Notice that (62) and (63), together with the union-wide equilibrium conditions
(52) and (53), imply that the equilibrium under the optimal policy will satisfy
￿
￿
t = e y
￿
t = e f
￿
t = 0 (64)
for all t. This is one of the central results emerging from our analysis. In words, we
can state it as follows: the combined monetary-￿scal policy mix must be such that,
at the union level, in￿ ation, the output gap and the ￿scal gap remain at a constant
(zero) value, at all times. That condition requires, in turn, that the equilibrium
interest rate r￿
t equals the union-wide natural rate rr￿
t at all times. As argued above,
and conditional on e f￿
t = 0 for all t, the union￿ s central bank can implement the
desired outcome by adopting a policy rule of the form:
rt = rr
￿
t + ￿￿ ￿
￿
t
What are the paths of in￿ ation and the output gap for each union member asso-
ciated with the optimal policy? What ￿scal policy will support those paths?








(1 + ’) e y
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i
￿;t (65)
In this second best environment, as long as prices are less than fully ￿ exible, we
have  
i
￿;t > 0. Hence (65) immediately implies that, unlike the union-wide policy
prescription (64), setting e fi
t = e yi
t = 0 for each member country i cannot be an
equilibrium under the optimal policy.







y;tdi (from (59)) must evolve exogenously from the viewpoint of
the single member country. By substituting (59), (60) and (61) into (56), (57) and



















and stochastic processes fai
t, a￿
tg, along with the initial condition
 
i
￿;￿1 = 0. Next we illustrate the implied equilibrium dynamics and the optimal
policy responses by means of some simulations.
4.6.1 Dynamic Simulations
In this section we illustrate the equilibrium behavior of the prototype member econ-
omy under the commitment policy described above. We resort to a series of dynamic
27simulations, and adopt the following benchmark parameterization. We assume ’ = 3,
which implies a labor supply elasticity of 1
3. We assume a steady-state markup
￿ = 1:2, which implies that ￿, the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated
goods (of the same origin), is 6. Parameter ￿ is set to a benchmark value of 0:75
(a value consistent with an average period of one year between price adjustments),
although below we report results of sensitivity analysis on this parameter. We assume
￿ = 0:99, which implies a riskless annual return of about 4 percent in the steady state.
As for the ￿scal sector, we parameterize the steady state share of government spend-
ing in output as ￿ = ￿ = 0:25, roughly the average of government ￿nal consumption
for the euro zone.
We follow the real business cycle literature (King and Rebelo (1999)) and assume
the following autoregressive process for labor productivity in country i:
a
i





Figure 2 displays impulse responses to a one percent (asymmetric) rise in produc-
tivity in the domestic economy for alternative values of the price stickiness parameter
￿. In particular, ￿ = 0 represents the limiting case of full (domestic) price ￿ exibility.
The ￿gure is representative of the main result of the paper.
Consider ￿rst the case of full price ￿ exibility (￿ = 0). In that case there is no loss of
e¢ ciency associated with in￿ ation, since the latter no longer creates any relative price
distortions. Hence, as shown in the ￿gure, it is optimal to fully close the ￿scal gap and
the output gap, in response to asymmetric movements in productivity.21. As a result,
it is optimal to have the union member fully absorb the rise in productivity through
an adjustment in the terms of trade brought about by a change in the domestic price
level, while maintaining output and government spending at their ￿rst-best levels.
To the extent that price stickiness is present (￿ > 0), there are welfare losses associ-
ated with departures from price stability, in addition to those stemming from nonzero
output and ￿scal gaps. However -as discussed above- the ￿ exible price/e¢ cient al-
location is not feasible under the currency union regime. In particular, the rise in
productivity must be absorbed only via a gradual and persistent fall in the price
level, with the consequent relative price distortions. As a result, the optimal policy
mix requires expanding the ￿scal gap to bring about the rise in demand necessary
to accommodate the desired expansion in output, thus smoothing the adjustment
21In fact, under price ￿ exibility, equation (50) does not act as a constraint on the evolution of
domestic prices. Hence, optimal policy in this case must satisfy equation (65) with  
i
￿;t = 0.
28of prices over time. To see that formally, notice that in the equilibrium under the
















t (and where, without loss of generality, we have normalized p￿
t = 0).
Hence, to the extent that the price level reacts gradually, the rise in productivity will
be absorbed via a combination of a fall in the output gap and a rise in the ￿scal gap.
In general, the local ￿scal authority is required to trade-o⁄movements in in￿ ation on
the one hand with movements in the output and ￿scal gap on the other. The higher
the degree of price rigidity, the larger the implied ￿ uctuations of both gaps under the
optimal policy.
Notice that, under our benchmark parameterization, welfare losses from any given
output gap variation are of an order of magnitude larger than the ones implied by the
same variation in the ￿scal gap. This explains why in Figure 2 the implied volatility
of the ￿scal gap is larger than the one in the output gap. The optimal balance
between the two variables will in general depend on the relative weights attached to
the quadratic terms in e yi
t and e fi
t in the welfare loss function (54). These weights
depend in turn on parameters ’ and ￿. The lower the elasticity of labor supply (i.e.,
the larger ’) the smaller the adjustment in the output gap (relative to the ￿scal gap),
whereas the larger ￿ (the share of government spending in the optimal steady state)
the lower the adjustment brought about via the ￿scal gap (relative to the output
gap).
5 Conclusions
We have developed a tractable multicountry framework suitable for monetary and
￿scal policy analysis in a currency union. As an application of the model, we have
determined the optimal monetary-￿scal policy mix in the presence of idiosyncratic
shocks to productivity. Given our assumed nominal rigidities, the presence of those
shocks, combined with the impossibility of resorting to nominal exchange rate ad-
justments, induces an ine¢ cient response of the terms of trade that generates room
for ￿scal policy as stabilization tool. In particular, the union-wide optimal policy
calls for variations in local government spending that go beyond the mere e¢ cient
provision of public goods. On the other hand, our ￿ndings suggest that the union￿ s
central bank should stick to a policy that aims to stabilize the price level in the union
29as a whole, thus resisting any temptation to accommodate the in￿ ationary pressures
that may arise from the aggregation of local ￿scal policies.
Our framework calls for extensions on a series of grounds. In order to meet
our self-imposed tractability requirement, we restrict ourselves to less-than-general
parametric speci￿cations for utility and technology, and ignore capital accumulation.
Furthermore, our model ignores other aspects that are likely to be relevant for the
design of optimal policies. Missing elements include, among others, the presence of
sticky wages (along with sticky prices), the need to rely on distortionary taxes, the
e⁄ects of government debt policies, and the likely existence of non-fully Ricardian
behavior on the part of households. Finally, our framework assumes the presence of
complete international ￿nancial markets. By relaxing the assumption of perfect risk-
sharing, we could generate a complementary role for ￿scal policy as a cross-country
insurance tool. The emergence of a potential con￿ ict between the latter and the
stabilization role described in the present paper is likely to constitute an interesting
line worth exploring in future research. We plan to pursue some of those extensions
in future work.
30Appendix
For notational simplicity we omit country subscripts, unless needed.
Taylor expansion of log(Yt ￿ Gt)
Let ￿ ￿ G
Y the steady state government spending share. De￿ne b yt ￿ log Yt
Y and
b gt ￿ log Gt
G . A second-order Taylor expansion of log(Yt ￿ Gt) about the steady state
yields:
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(1 ￿ ￿)2 (b yt ￿ ￿b gt)
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= log((1 ￿ ￿)Y ) +
1
1 ￿ ￿




(1 ￿ ￿)2 (b gt ￿ b yt)
2
Let e yt = yt ￿ yt and e gt = gt ￿ gt denote the output and ￿scal gaps, respectively,
as de￿ned in the text. Note that= b yt = e yt + (yt ￿ y) and b gt = e gt + (gt ￿ g): Hence,
b gt ￿ b yt = e gt ￿ e yt + (gt ￿ yt) ￿ log￿.
Quite generally, gt and yt will depend on exogenous shocks only. In the present
model, gt￿yt = log￿. Thus, when considering ￿ uctuations about the e¢ cient steady
state (with ￿ = ￿) we have b gt ￿ b yt = e gt ￿ e yt, allowing to write:
log(Yt ￿ Gt) ’
1
1 ￿ ￿






















31Using the fact that
R 1
0 si
t di = 0 and assuming a common (optimal) steady state































































































1+’(1 + ’) b n
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where b nt ￿ log Nt
N . In the model in the text, the steady state about which the economy
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t + tips
The next step consists in rewriting the previous expression in terms of the output










dj , we have
b nt = b yt ￿ at + zt
= e yt + zt







dj, and where we use the fact that yt = at:
The following lemma shows that zt is proportional to the cross-sectional distrib-
ution of relative prices (and, hence, of second order).
32Lemma 1: zt ’ ￿
2 varjfpt(j)g
Proof: see Appendix 2.
Using the previous results we can thus rewrite the second order approximation
to the disutility of labor about that steady state in terms of the output gap and the
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2
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Collecting results and reintroducing country subscripts, we can write the second
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Proof: see appendix 2.











































33Appendix 2: Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2
Lemma 1: zt ’ ￿
2 varjfpt(j)g





= exp[(1 ￿ ￿) b pt(j)]































































Proof: we make use of the following property of the Calvo model, as shown in















￿ , as in the text. The desired result follows trivially from Lemma
1.
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Figure 1. Impulse Responses to a Government Consumption Shock











































Figure 2. Productivity Shock under the Optimal Policy
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